Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce): Gibbons v. Ogden (2024)

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce)

Document 14

Gibbons v. Ogden

Platt, J. This is an appeal from an order of the Court ofChancery, denying a motion for dissolving an injunction,whereby the steam-boat of the appellant was restrainedfrom running between Elizabeth-town Point in New-Jerseyand the city of New-York.

The great question which arose in the case of Livingstonand Fulton v. Van Ingen and others, (9 Johns. Rep. 507.)whether this state had the power to grant an exclusiveright of navigating its waters with steam-boats, is againraised in this cause. That question was then elaboratelyand profoundly discussed on appeal in this court; and aftermature consideration, this court, by a unanimous decree,decided, that the statutes of this state for grantingand securing to Livingston and Fulton, and their assigns,that exclusive privilege, were constitutional and valid.

Immediately after that decision, many persons who hadresisted the claim to such exclusive privilege, yielding obedienceto that decree, as settling the question by the highestjudicial tribunal of the state, became purchasers of thatprivilege under Livingston and Fulton. The respondent,Aaron Ogden, stands before this court as an assignee underthem, and claims the benefit of his purchase. His right isdenied by the appellant; 1st. On the old ground, that thestate had no power to grant such exclusive privilege in anycase; and, 2dly, That he (the appellant) derives authorityto navigate his steam-boats under the act of Congress ofthe 18th of February, 1793, for enrolling and licensingcoasting vessels, &c.

As to the first general question, I consider it as nolonger open for discussion here. It would be trifling withthe rights of individuals, and highly derogatory to thecharacter of the court, if it were now to depart from itsformer deliberate decision on the very same point.

As to the second ground relied on by the appellant, towit, the coasting license, I am unable to discern how thatcan vary the merits of the question, as presented in thecase of Livingston v. Van Ingen.

The act of Congress for enrolling and licensing coastingships, or vessels, &c. enacts, that "no ships or vessels, exceptsuch as shall be so enrolled and licensed, shall bedeemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to theprivileges of ships or vessels employed in the coastingtrade or fisheries." (sect. 1.) And the same act also declares,that every ship or vessel engaged in the coastingtrade, &c., and not being so enrolled and licensed, "shallpay the same fees and tonnage in every port of the UnitedStates at which she may arrive, as ships or vessels not belongingto a citizen or citizens of the United States; and ifshe have on board any articles of foreign growth or manufacture,or distilled spirits other than sea-stores, the shipor vessel, with her tackle and lading, shall be forfeited."(sect. 6.)

From these provisions, and an examination of the variousregulations of that statute, and from all the laws ofthe United States on that subject, it appears, that the onlydesign of the federal government, in regard to the enrollingand licensing of vessels, was to establish a criterion ofnational character, with a view to enforce the laws whichimpose discriminating duties on American vessels, and thoseof foreign countries.

The term "license" seems not to be used in the sense imputedto it by the counsel for the appellant: that is, a permitto trade; or as giving a right of transit. Because it is perfectlyclear, that such a vessel, coasting from one state to another,would have exactly the same right to trade, and thesame right of transit, whether she had the coasting licenseor not. She does not, therefore, derive her right from thelicense; the only effect of which is, to determine her nationalcharacter, and the rate of duties which she is to pay.

Whatever may be the abstract right of Congress, to passlaws for regulating trade, which might come in collision,and conflict with the exclusive privilege granted by thisstate, it is sufficient, now, for the protection of the respondent,that the statute of the United States relied on by theappellant, is not of that character.

Whether Congress have the power to authorize thecoasting trade to be carried on, in vessels propelled bysteam, so as to give a paramount right, in opposition to thespecial license given by this state, is a question not yet presentedto us. No such act of Congress yet exists, and it willbe time enough to discuss that question when it arises.

I am decidedly of opinion, therefore, that the coastinglicense affords no aid or support to the title of the appellant,to run a steam-boat on our waters, in opposition tothe laws of this state.

The real merits of this case fall precisely within the decisionof this court, in the case of Livingston, &c. v. VanIngen. As a senator, I was a party to that decision; and concurredin it, for the reasons which were then assigned bythe learned judges who delivered the opinion of the court.Those reasons are before the public: and I have not thevanity to believe, that I could add any thing to their forceor perspicuity. I, therefore, deem it my only remainingduty to say, that in my judgment, the decree of his honorthe chancellor, in this case, ought to be affirmed.

The Founders' Constitution
Volume 2, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce), Document 14
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_3_commerces14.html
The University of Chicago Press

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